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I.  Introduction 
Canada is a nation of immigrants.  Decades of open and compassionate immigration 
policies have earned Canada a solid reputation abroad in this regard.  However, as long as there 
has been immigration in this country, concerns have existed over the impact of immigration on 
the labour market and, more importantly, the role that discrimination plays regarding income 
differentials.  This paper will analyze the earning differentials of immigrants, which shall be 
defined as ethnic minorities.  The methodology that this paper uses will be, in order to highlight 
the issue, a literature review and a regression analysis of earning differentials.   
II.  The Issue 
Immigrants have had a major role in building Canada.  Since the Second World War, 
Canada has accepted close to 7.8 million immigrants or almost 150,000 annually (Economic 
Council of Canada, 1991).  From 1990 onwards, the annual intake has been just under 230,000 or 
about 0.7% of our population.  At this rate, Canada accepts more immigrants and refugees than 
any other country, in terms of a percentage of total population.  Roughly 4.5 million people, 
some sixteen percent of Canada's population of 29 million, are foreign-born (Economic Council 
of Canada, 1991).  The ethnic composition of the Canadian populace has also changed rapidly.  
In 1957, the top ten source countries for immigration were all European, with the United 
Kingdom accounting for one-third of the total.  Forty years later, in 1997, eight of the top ten 
source countries for immigration were non-European.  About twenty five percent of Canadian 
immigrants now come from Hong Kong, China and Taiwan and about twenty percent from the 
Indian subcontinent (Reitz, 1998).  With these numbers, the issue of discrimination arises when 
immigrants are trying to secure employment within the Canadian labour market.   Of all the 
immigrants coming to Canada, most fall under the skilled worker category.  These are 
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immigrants who possess work skills, which are deemed wanted by the Canadian government’s 
National Occupational Classification (Hawkins, 1989).  Such skills often include technical skills, 
in the fields of science and medicine, but also quite frequently labour skills, to fill labour gaps 
that the current Canadian population either cannot or is unwilling to fill. 
III.  Literature Review 
The article, “The Colour of Money: Earnings Differentials Among Ethnic Groups in 
Canada,” written by Krishna Pendakur and Ravi Pendakur is about the earning differentials 
among ethnic groups in Canada.  The purpose of their article is to assess the usefulness of the 
distinction between white and visible-minority by evaluating ethnically based earning 
differentials with respects to white and visible-minority aggregates.  This topic is of importance 
because there are inherent discrepancies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
the Employment Equity Act such that a “person’s ethnic heritage should not constrain his or her 
labour market opportunity” (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).  The Pendakurs point out that there 
has been increasing evidence that supports the existence and magnitude of earnings and wage 
disparities among ethnic groups in Canada.  Also, their paper questions public policy that focuses 
primarily on “discrimination against visible minorities instead of discrimination against specific 
ethnic groups” (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).  The authors conclude that there are substantial 
earning differentials both between and within the white and visible-minority categories.  
Interestingly enough, they are trying to show how the “white versus visible-minority 
classification system hides ethnically based differences within these aggregate groups” 
(Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).  The Pendakurs’ paper also states that differentials between 
whites and visible minorities suggest that the visible minority category is a useful indicator of 
economic discrimination.  Finally, they conclude that policy makers must take care when 
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discussing ethnicity-based earnings gaps and discrimination to specify whom they mean when 
they are talking about the disadvantaged (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).   
The results of the Pendakurs’ findings were quite startling.  Their analysis demonstrates 
that Canadian born visible-minority women and Canadian born white-women all have 
approximately equal average earnings (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).  However, immigrant 
visible-minority women earn less than all other women.  The results also show that the mean 
earnings of immigrant white males are higher than those of Canadian born white males.  
However, immigrant visible-minority males earn much less than Canadian born white males 
(Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).  Lastly, they state that even after controlling for the factors that 
typically cause differentials in earnings, there will still be substantial gaps between ethnic 
groups.  Looking at the different tools of analysis, mainly regressions and the authors’ reasoning, 
the results are convincing.   
The main drawback of the Pendakurs’ article is that the data presented might not be as 
objective as it appears to be at first glance.  There are many multi-ethnic and Canadian born 
people of multiple ethnic backgrounds; hence, this discussion of race or ethnicity is prone to 
subjectivity.  For example, workers who claim multiple ethnic origins can say that they are from 
a number of different backgrounds.  However, the analysis does not fit these sorts of people into 
a specific category because the data collected is based upon individual subjectivity.  Hence, there 
is an element of subjectivity on the part of the individual giving such data.  Ideally, the analysis 
would try to treat these issues regarding ethnicity and race.  If rooting out this subjectivity is not 
feasible, then the analysis should discuss discrepancies arising from such subjective data, 
perhaps by studying how different permutations of ethnicity would lead to a difference in earning 
differentials, all other variables being equal.   
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The paper written by Howland and Sakellariou, “Wage discrimination, occupational 
segregation and visible minorities in Canada”, analyzes the relative economic position of both 
immigrants and native-born minorities.  This was the first paper of its kind in Canada to analyze 
the earnings gap between native-born visible minorities and Canadian-born while considered the 
earnings effect of differences in occupational attainment (Howland and Sakellariou, 1993).  The 
main findings of this paper are that anti-discrimination legislation aimed at decreasing the 
earnings gap between visible minority and white women should have a dual focus: it should aim 
to reduce inter-occupational wages discrimination and to provide training programmes to widen 
employment opportunities for ethnic minority women.  Their paper also supports the conclusions 
that were reached in the article, “The Colour of Money: Earnings Differential Among Ethnic 
Groups in Canada” by Krishna Pendakur and Ravi Pendakur.  However, Howland and 
Sakellariou examined earning gaps between whites, Asians and blacks and how these disparities 
relate to earnings of productivity-related characteristics, wage discrimination and occupational 
segregation.  Similarly, they did not take into account the subjectivity of the discussion of 
ethnicity or race nor have they provided a system whereby this subjectivity can be eliminated to 
resolve the discrepancies from arising from such data.  Lastly, Howland and Sakellariou discuss 
occupational segregation, which the Pendakurs did not deal with.   
Christofides and Swidinsky’s article, “Wage Determination by Gender and Visible-
Minority Status: Evidence from the 1989 LMAS” analyzes the wage implications for people 
distinguished by gender and visible minority status from the 1989 Labour Market Activity 
Survey.  They examined whether the differences in earnings could be explained by productivity-
related characteristics.  Their main finding was that thirty percent of the offered wage 
differentials between white males-minority females, white males-white females and white males-
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minority males can be attributed to productivity-related factors (Christofides and Swidinsky, 
1994).  They also concluded that there were no differences between minority males-white 
females and white females-minority females, which can also be explained by productivity factors 
(Christofides and Swidinsky, 1994).  Even more surprising, the wage differentials between 
minority males and minority females are not because of gender or ethnic discrimination but due 
to differences in productivity characteristics.  Christofides and Swidinsky used a much broader 
definition of visible minority than the Pendakurs and there were no categories for multiple-
ethnicity.  After consultations with Statistics Canada, Christofides and Swidinsky realized that 
the self-identification information was not reliable and should not be used in the analysis of 
labour market discrimination.  With that in mind, the authors went ahead and used the data, and 
thus their results were different from those of the Pendakurs.  This difference in data sets shows 
how the manner in which results, regarding discrimination with respect to earning differentials, 
can change.   
Beach and Worswick provide another piece of literature on this issue.  “Is there a double-
negative effect on the earnings of immigrant women?” focuses particularly on immigrant 
women, a group not closely examined by the above-mentioned authors.  This paper investigates 
whether immigrant women in Canada have lower earnings than Canadian-born women, in 
addition to the conventional findings of gender earning differentials.  They highlighted four 
major findings.  The first is a highly significant determinant of earnings, whose effect clearly 
dominates that of more traditional proxies (marital status and number of children) of women’s 
time spent outside the labour market (Beach and Worswick, 1993).  They found that working 
immigrant women reported a slightly higher degree of labour market experience and a smaller 
number of children than Canadian-born women and a nine percent higher earnings (Beach and 
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Worswick, 1993).  They also concluded that the earnings differentials were not the same for all 
immigrant women.  The initial levels of earnings were estimated to be around twelve to fifteen 
percent; however, there appeared to be a large double-negative effect for some immigrant 
groups, particularly highly educated immigrants.  Thirdly, the empirical studies supported the 
fact that immigrant wives initially subsidized their husbands’ investments in long run, skill-
specific jobs (Beach and Worswick, 1993).  Lastly, the adjustment for immigrant women after 
coming to Canada does not appear to be statistically significant.  This implies that any initial 
earnings gap, in relation to Canadian-born women, changes very little over the worker’s career 
and may even worsen.   
IV.  Discussion 
A major tenet of the Canadian immigration policy is the selection of immigrants who will 
benefit Canada economically because of their skills and abilities, including those who can fill 
Canada's immediate labour market needs.  Increasingly, these needs reflect Canada's move to a 
knowledge-based economy.  Immigrants are chosen on the basis of their ability to meet defined 
selection criteria, which are derived based upon their propensity to provide Canada with an 
adaptable, educated, and professionally experienced work force (Economic Council of Canada, 
1991).   
Canada's current Immigration Act and Regulations date from 1976 but they have been 
amended several times in the last decade to respond to such difficult issues as refugee 
determination and inadmissibility (Fagnan and DeVoretz (ed), 1995). The Act is based on 
several broad and occasionally inconsistent policy objectives: the attainment of demographic 
goals, the enrichment of Canada's cultural and social fabric, the facilitation of family 
reunification, the fulfillment of Canada's international obligations and the maintenance of our 
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humanitarian traditions, the fostering of a strong and viable Canadian economy, the protection of 
the health, the preservation of safety in Canadian society, and the promotion of international 
order and justice (Reitz, 1998).  
The question that must be asked is how these policies affect immigrants’ earnings when 
compared to Canadian-born workers.  Given that immigrants are selected on the basis of their 
ability to meet defined selection criteria, then why do earning differentials exist between 
immigrants and the Canadian-born population?  The only logical answer would be that 
discrimination is the underlying factor within the labour market.  Within the economic group of 
immigrants, Canada has an active programme to attract entrepreneurs and investors who can 
establish or contribute to new and existing businesses and create job opportunities for Canadians.  
This seems to be oxymoronic: on one hand, the Canadian government is actively seeking out 
those immigrants who can be beneficial to the Canadian labour market.  Conversely, 
discriminatory policies set by employers have the opposite effect – immigrants become a burden 
on the labour market. 
Immigrants generally start out in the labour market at a distinct competitive disadvantage, 
largely as a result of discrimination in the educational system.  However, their handicaps do not 
end there; in the labour market itself, this segment of the population does not have an equal 
opportunity to make the best of their disadvantaged beginnings.   
Discrimination can take several forms.  Employment discrimination means that some 
people are not hired because of non-economic characteristics such as race and gender.  Two 
individuals with the same training, education and experience apply for a job.  One is an 
immigrant of a visible minority group and the other is a Canadian-born who is not a visible 
minority.  Both can function if placed within the job.  If both do not have the same chance of 
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getting the job, discrimination has entered into the decision-making process.  This sort of 
discrimination is difficult to identify positively.  Differences in unemployment rates among 
whites and visible minorities may suggest discrimination, but do not prove that it exists.    
Another possible explanation of how immigrants, especially women, are discriminated 
against is the theory of occupational segregation (Fellows et al., 1997).  This theory holds that 
women are crowded into certain jobs.  Most women work in occupations that are mainly filled 
by women, for example, nurses, bank tellers, and secretaries.  While women are not excluded 
from other jobs, entry is more difficult.  This crowding effect increases supply in lowers wages 
in these areas.  While labour market segregation may be decreasing, many economists believe 
that it is a significant factor in explaining gender-based differences in pay (Fellows et al., 1997). 
V.  Methodology for Further Research and Analysis – Modeling Strategies and Data Sets       
The data set that is used for developing the ideas in this paper is from the 1996 Census 
administered by Statistics Canada.  This survey contains all the necessary data needed for the 
proposed analysis of earning differentials among ethnic groups in Canada.  The data set contains 
6685 observations for an undefined group.  This group contains males and females, of all 
ethnicities (none of which were recorded as multiple ethnicities), that reported wages and salaries 
in the province of Alberta.     
Table 1:  Variables: 
Variables Definition Sample 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Province The province in which the sample size is 
located, in this case, Alberta 
48 0 
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Age The age at which individuals reported at the 
time of the census 
38.3466 11.74311 
Sex Male or Female 1.54166 0.4982987 
Immigran Immigrant Status Indicator 1.298878 0.4578005 
Ethnicor Ethnic Origin 12.76245 10.963 
Highestl Highest Level of Schooling:  the sample size 
that reported an education above high school 
7.89813 2.655111 
Wagessal Wages & Salaries reported at the time of the 
census 
29027.83 26103.91 
 
There were some observations that reported missing values.  As seen in Appendix 1, 
variables that were reporting missing values were dropped.  Prior to dropping these missing 
variables, the original sample size was 9121.  Some of these variables have been transformed.  
The categorical variables have been converted into dummy variables.  The purpose of the 
dummy variable is to control for unobserved, but systematic differences between observations 
from different categories.  The wages and salaries variable was converted to the logarithm of 
wages and salaries, thereby reducing heteroscedasticity if the wages and salaries variable has 
heteroscedastic error terms.   
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Table 2:  Estimating Wage/Earnings Equation: 
Independent Variables Estimated 
Coefficients 
Estimated 
t-ratio 
R-
squared 
Number of 
Observations 
Sex 0.50 17.28 (*) 0.1391 6685 
Age2 0.00 10.31(*) 0.1391 6685 
Immigrant Status Indicator  
 
-0.14 -3.474 0.1391 6685 
Ethnic Origin Indicator 
(Canadian) 
-0.19 -4.52 (*) 0.1391 6685 
 Ethnic Origin Indicator (other 
ethnicities, please see Appendix 
1 and Appendix 2) 
  0.1391 6685 
Highest Level of Education 
University: BA 
0.62 12.43 0.1391 6685 
University: MA 0.72 3.87 (*) 0.1391 6685 
University: PhD 0.98 6.02 (*) 0.1391 6685 
(*) – Indication of a coefficient that is statistically different from 0 
The results show that as an individual increases their education, the earning differentials 
also increase until they have earned a Ph.D.  Also, this shows that the gender and age of an 
individual will also determine whether discrimination is a factor in earnings differentials.  There 
were only nine ethnic minority indicators that had a statistically significant t-ratio; however, not 
a single ethnic minority indicator yielded a positive coefficient estimate.  The purpose of this 
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regression analysis was to construct a model, which would be used to identify the effects of 
earning differentials between aggregate groups of Canadians and immigrants of different ethnic 
origins.  This analysis should determine whether immigrants are faced with earning differentials 
in relation to their Canadian counterparts.  It can be concluded that the data set does not give any 
determinant conclusion as to whether the proposed analysis was able to produce original results 
that would contribute to the understanding of this issue.    
 Looking at the data and its codebook (Appendix 2), it seems that those ethnicities that 
reported a statistically significant t-ratio were those ethnicities from Africa, Asia, Latin America 
and the Middle East.  Those that were not significant were from Europe and the Caribbean.  
However, those individuals that reported Canadian as their ethnic origin were faced with an 
earning differential of nineteen percent.  This may be the case where people considered 
themselves to be Canadian instead of the ethnicity of their birth country, for example, a man born 
in India considering himself to be Canadian and not Indian.       
 When looking at the results of other economists, they have either selected against or 
failed to test for other things.  Christofides and Swidinsky do not mention people that are of 
European descent.  Likewise, Howland and Sakellariou do not mention anyone other than those 
belonging to South East Asian, South Asian or black ethnic groups.  Moreover, they do not 
examine the differences between people who claim only one ethnic origin and people who claim 
multiple ethnic origins.  Beach and Worswick only focused on the economic issues facing 
immigrant women.  Also, the data used by Beach and Worswick came from the 1973 Job 
Mobility Survey conducted by Statistics Canada as a supplementary questionnaire to the regular 
Monthly Labour Force Survey.  Their analysis focused only on earnings and not on any non-
monetary employment benefits for which no data was available.  Also, there has been no 
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apparent attempt to study other forms of discrimination in the labour market such as consumer 
and statistical discrimination.         
 A method that could be used to further decompose the observed wage gaps into two 
components would be the Blind-Oaxaca decomposition.  The two decomposed components 
would be the differences in mean earnings due to differences in mean observable characteristics 
and the differences in mean earnings due to different treatment of human capital characteristics.  
Many would consider the first component as a legitimate source of wage differentials; however, 
the second component would be considered a heinous discriminatory portion of wage 
differences.  Unfortunately, this regression analysis cannot differentiate human capital 
characteristics nor can it look at the mean observed characteristics.             
VI.  Economic Costs of Discrimination       
 The economic costs of discrimination are both individualist and societal.  The individual 
costs of discrimination are those imposed on the individual who loses one way or another 
because of discrimination.  The social cost of discrimination takes the form of a reduction in total 
output of the economy due to discrimination (Fellows et al., 1997).     
 Individuals that are discriminated against suffer from losses in the form of reduced living 
standards.  They tend to be paid less for what they sell, to pay higher prices for what they buy, to 
have fewer employment opportunities, and to be segregated in low-paying occupations.  
Individuals who discriminate may both gain and lose something from their behavior.  An 
employer practicing discriminatory hiring policies may gain something if a female worker can be 
hired at a lower wage than a male worker, assuming that both are equally productive.  The wages 
of Canadian-born may be kept artificially high if immigrants are shut off from jobs and 
occupations because of their status.  Discriminators, however, may lose by having to forfeit 
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income in order to satisfy their taste for discrimination.  For example, an individual who refuses 
to sell his or her house to a South Asian may end up selling the house at a lower price to a 
Canadian-white born person, or an individual who refuses to hire a woman may end up paying a 
higher wage to a man with the same productivity.   Market imperfections are caused by imperfect 
knowledge, immobility of resources, and imperfect competition.  That being said, this should not 
be mistaken for competitive labour markets, which result in workers of equal ability being 
treated equally by an employer.  The demand for labour is determined by the employee’s 
marginal revenue product; workers who contribute more to their employer’s output and revenues 
will command higher wages than those who contribute less.  Wage differentials in competitive 
markets reflect differences in employee productivity.  Such wage differentials should not be 
confused with labour market discrimination.  Similarly, employers would have very little 
incentive to stir up racial and ethnic troubles.  Schiller states that profits, politics and to some 
extent, recreation command more attention and commitment (Schiller, 1998).  If this is the case, 
then employers who are participating in a perfectly competitive market will choose not to 
discriminate.            
 Employers who do discriminate against immigrants and minority workers do so because 
of statistical discrimination.  Statistical discrimination, according to Bruce, is defined as 
“discrimination in the sense that individuals from the majority group will have a higher 
preference to be selected than the minority group, even when there are applicants in the minority 
group who would have proven to be as productive as those in the majority group” (Bruce, 1995).  
One might ask why this is statistical in nature.  According to Bruce, the source of discrimination 
is a statistical correlation between the indicator being used to make a hiring decision and the 
expected level of productivity” (Bruce, 1995).  In reality, employers do not know for sure which 
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potential employees will turn out to be the most productive.  Tests and educational credentials 
are used to help reduce such certainty, but if all such screening criteria were eliminated, 
employers might rely more on racial characteristics.  This proves to be quite problematic for 
immigrants.  Many immigrants have received their education outside of Canada.  Among these 
educated immigrants, an important reason for an earnings penalty could be non-equivalence or 
non-recognition of academic credentials (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998).  Immigrants, who have 
gained professional and technical degrees abroad, may face an earnings gap compared with 
similarly educated workers with Canadian degrees and certificates because those international 
degrees are not recognized or are not equivalent to those gained in Canada.  Therefore, if these 
professional and technical skills go unnoticed, it may just as well be that Canada is losing a large 
portion of its productive and effective workforce.  Moreover, an immigrant man who is a part of 
a visible-minority and who completed his education in Canada may expect to earn 16.2 percent 
less than a Canadian-born white man, even though both have a Canadian education (Pendakur 
and Pendakur, 1998).         
 Immigrants and members of ethnic minorities, especially women, have been pushed into 
low-wage occupations.  The effect of segregation by occupation is twofold.  First, the supply of 
labour is increased in occupations restricted to minority groups, which causes a depression of 
wages in those occupations.  Second, the supply of labour is decreased in occupations closed off 
to minority groups, thus increasing wages in those occupations.  The result is to create a wider 
gap between low- and high-wage occupations.       
 According to Howland and Sakellariou, differences in the levels of occupational 
determining endowment characteristics between Canadian white-born and women belonging to 
the Asian ethnic group played a significant role in the earnings disadvantage of these women 
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(Howland and Sakellariou, 1993).  However, occupational segregation had no role in the 
women’s earnings gap.  They conclude that polices to decrease the earnings differentials between 
Canadian white-born and visible minorities by equalizing the ethnic representation across 
occupational categories would be effective only for males from black ethnic groups (Howland 
and Sakellariou, 1993).           
 The next question that needs to be answered is why do women, especially those that are 
immigrants, fail to enter higher paid male-dominated occupations?  First of all, many of these 
occupations have a lack of female role models or mentors, which enforces the traditional view of 
the division of labour between the sexes.  Immigrants, especially those from areas where 
traditional roles are acted out to their fullest extent, would find entry to these male-dominated 
occupations even more difficult than Canadian white-born females would.  The division of 
labour within households often leaves women at home to provide domestic services, such as 
raising children, whereas men pursue work in the labour market to provide income for the 
family.  According to Schiller, an explanation for these job and pay discrepancies is the lesser 
labour force attached to women (Schiller, 1998).  Most working women either start their careers 
after having children or interrupt their careers for that purpose. Often, this is the case with 
immigrant women.  Many immigrant women have left their careers, if they were indeed 
employed, back in order to pursue a new life, so to speak, in which these interruptions are 
inevitable.  Role differentiation and labour-market discrimination tend to reinforce each other.
 There are also non-market forms of discrimination, such as social discrimination, that are 
present in the labour market.  Social discrimination would be difficult to root out, since it is 
based on deep-rooted beliefs and customs.  In comparison to market discrimination, it would also 
be difficult to associate monetary costs with social discrimination. Fellows et al., go so far as 
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saying that the source of market discrimination is social discrimination and that the self-interest 
motive in the market tends to overcome and reduce the effectiveness of discrimination in the 
labour market.                 
VII.  Policy Solutions         
 Policy makers have tried to come up with legislation and regulations in order to eliminate 
discriminatory practices from occurring in the labour market.  However, these policies are 
deemed almost useless because discrimination still flourishes in the labour market.  Even though 
immigration played an important role in Canada’s history, and it should continue to do so, policy 
makers hold the view that there should be some changes.  Some people may argue that 
immigration must be limited to those who possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly 
and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market.  Other restrictions they 
think Canada should impose include a much tighter and enforced quota system for skilled worker 
immigrants, based on Canada’s current employment needs, they should encourage immigration 
for the purpose of business, and that Canada should limit immigrant sponsorship (DeVoretz, 
1995).           
 However, these policies are only good for immigrants coming into the country, not for 
those who are already participating in the labour market.  Policies for landed immigrants should 
be multifactorial and should include: education, legislation, government subsidies, and reduction 
of discrimination in the development of human capital and occupational segregation.   
 Educating Canadians, as a whole, would teach them to understand others so that they will 
not be predisposed to stereotyped views of ethnicity.  Many prejudices are based on stereotypes, 
which have little or no basis in fact.  This leads to something known as erroneous discrimination, 
whereby those who discriminate honestly believe untrue stereotypes, which suggest that the 
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discrimination is based on objectively valid criteria (Fellows et al., 1997).  Beach and Worswick 
argued that the lack of language training for women is an important source of female immigrant 
earnings degradation (Beach and Worswick, 1993).  Conversely, Fagnan stated that female 
immigrants are not penalized for not having English as a mother tongue whereas male immigrant 
earners are (Fagnan and DeVoretz (ed.), 1995).  By providing education to both employers and 
immigrants in terms of anti-discriminatory policies would prove to be beneficial.   
 Another policy solution towards curbing discrimination is the use of legislation.  
Legislation, in the hopes of changing peoples’ tastes, would prove to be difficult in reducing 
discrimination.  However, laws can establish a framework for reducing discrimination.  The most 
basic set of laws, in Canada, is the Canadian Charter of Rights.  In addition, there are provincial 
charters to protect human rights and federal and provincial legislation that deals with wage and 
employment discrimination.  Even though legislation cannot force individuals to change their 
prejudices, it can have substantial effects on the way they behave.  Legislation can reduce 
discrimination if the law increases the cost of discriminating beyond the amount that the 
individual is willing to pay.  The penalties could include fines or loss of government contracts.  
 Legislation can also help to deter another form of discrimination – consumer 
discrimination.  This form of discrimination arises when the consumer forms a bias against a 
certain group and refuses to deal with employees of that group.  Therefore, immigrants of a 
visible-minority may have limited opportunities to get jobs that involve personal contact with 
customers (Schiller, 1998).  A related concern is the possibility that consumers may believe that 
the product of a minority group is of a lesser quality than that of the dominant group (Bruce, 
1995).  For example, if a substantial proportion of customers have a preference of being served 
by or dealing with white staff, employers may refuse to hire employees of another ethnicity, 
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because such actions could cost them customers.  For example, if the law requires all car repair 
shops to stop discriminating in their hiring processes, then the prejudiced customer has no choice 
but to use the services of any available mechanic, whether white or a member of a visible-
minority group.              
 A third solution for discrimination would be government subsidies.  Subsidy payments 
would be made to employers who do not practice discrimination in hiring, wages, and 
promotions.  Employers who discriminate would be sacrificing subsidy payments, thus providing 
an incentive not to discriminate.  In this case, the opportunity cost of discrimination would be 
equal to the subsidy payment.  Government subsidy payments could reduce discrimination if the 
payments were equal to or greater than the non-monetary gain the discriminator receives from 
discrimination.              
 Policies looking at occupational segregation are quite controversial and are still being 
discussed today.  As mentioned above, the effects of occupational segregation are twofold.  
There are policies similar to affirmative action programmes which encourage the employment of 
groups who have historically been discriminated against.  However, this sort of programme can 
result in “reverse discrimination.”  Proponents of such polices claim it is justified as a 
counterbalance to existing discrimination (Fellows et al., 1997).  This is also where the idea of 
role modeling and mentoring comes in.  For example, a female professor of engineering would 
serve to encourage female students to enter the profession or a black person in the medical 
profession may entice other students of similar ethnicity to enter medicine.  However, those that 
are opposed to such policies claim that reverse discrimination is still discrimination and thus, is 
unfair (Fellows et al., 1997).                
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VIII. Conclusion           
 The topic of discrimination, as discussed in this paper, is a very broad one.  It 
encompasses many aspects of Canadian policy towards immigrants and Canadian-born people.  
It is also a topic of ongoing research, which has opened many more doors regarding immigration 
and discrimination in the labour market.  Through the use of legislation, changes in anti-
discriminatory behavior and policies will hopefully eliminate, if not curb, the role that 
discrimination plays regarding income differentials amongst Canada’s ethnic minority 
populations.   
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Appendix 2: 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' 
 
 
 
[ Data Collection Help ] [ Data Analysis Help ] 
[ Data Centre Help ] [ Extraction Help ] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
                       'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use  
Microdata' 
                 USER CODEBOOK    Wed Dec 15 14:11:58 MST 1999 
               ************************************************** 
               *                                                * 
               *      Generated by spss_to_codebook_0.2.pl      * 
               *                                                * 
               ************************************************** 
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 1 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
PROVP, Province/Territory 
 
 
 
Field: 1 Position: 1-2 Format: F2.0 
      
     CONTENT                             CODE       SAMPLE 
     Newfoundland                          10        15199 
     Prince Edward Island                  11         3690 
     Nova Scotia                           12        24999 
     New Brunswick                         13        20268 
     Quebec                                24       195696 
     Ontario                               35       295633 
     Manitoba                              46        30564 
     Saskatchewan                          47        27128 
     Alberta                               48        74144 
     British Columbia                      59       102494 
     Yukon and Northwest                   60         2633 
      
Coverage: 
     Valid cases 792448 Missing cases 0 
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 15 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
AGEP, Age 
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Field: 15 Position: 23-24 Format: F2.0 
      
     CONTENT                            VALUE       VALID N 
     MEAN                               35.35 
     MINIMUM                                0 
     MAXIMUM                               85 
     RANGE                                 85       792390 
     Not available                         98 
      
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 16 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
SEXP, Sex 
 
 
 
Field: 16 Position: 25-25 Format: F1.0 
      
     CONTENT                             CODE       SAMPLE 
     Female                                 1       403335 
     Male                                   2       389113 
      
Coverage: 
     Valid cases 792448 Missing cases 0 
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 22 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
IMMPOPP, Immigrant Status Indicator 
 
 
 
Field: 22 Position: 33-33 Format: F1.0 
      
     CONTENT                             CODE       SAMPLE 
     Non-immigrants                         1       650346 
     Immigrants                             2       137603 
     Non-permanent Res                      3         4498 
     Not available                          8            1 
      
Coverage: 
     Valid cases 792447 Missing cases 1 
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 29 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
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ETHNICRP, Ethnic Origin 
 
 
 
Field: 29 Position: 42-43 Format: F2.0 
      
     CONTENT                             CODE       SAMPLE 
     Sgl: British Isles                     1        90899 
     Sgl: French                            2        74579 
     Sgl: Dutch                             3         8393 
     Sgl: German                            4        20111 
     Sgl: Other W.Europe                    5         2307 
     Sgl: Hungarian                         6         2589 
     Sgl: Polish                            7         7255 
     Sgl: Ukrainian                         8         9125 
     Sgl: Balkans                           9         4503 
     Sgl: Greek                            10         3970 
     Sgl: Italian                          11        20038 
     Sgl: Portuguese                       12         6795 
     Sgl: Spanish                          13         1984 
     Sgl: Jewish                           14         5432 
     Sgl: Oth Europe (2)                   15        10009 
     Sgl: Africa (2)                       16         3622 
     Sgl: Lebanese                         17         2303 
     Sgl: Other Arab                       18         2608 
     Sgl: West Asia                        19         2918 
     Sgl: South Asia                       20        15947 
     Sgl: Chinese                          21        22315 
     Sgl: Filipino (2)                     22         5584 
     Sgl: Vietnamese (2)                   23         3031 
     Sgl: Oth E/S-E.Asia                   24         4420 
     Sgl: Lat/Cntl/S Amer                  25         3325 
     Sgl: Caribbean (2)                    26         8613 
     Sgl: Aboriginal                       27        13398 
     Sgl: Canadian                         28       148269 
      
Coverage: 
     Valid cases 792405 Missing cases 43 
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 74 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
HLOSP, Highest Level of Schooling 
 
 
 
Field: 74 Position: 90-91 Format: F2.0 
      
     CONTENT                             CODE       SAMPLE 
     < than Grade 5                         1        15994 
     Grade 5-8                              2        59479 
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     Grade 9-13                             3       142364 
     High School Grad                       4        90169 
     Trades Cert/Diploma                    5        23104 
     Oth nonU: No Oth Crt                   6        40526 
     Oth nonU: with Trade                   7        39286 
     Oth nonU: with Oth C                   8        72319 
     Univ: No Cert/Dipl                     9        20566 
     Univ: With Cert/Dipl                  10        39972 
     Univ: BA or Prof Deg                  11        58017 
     Univ: BA + Cert/Dipl                  12         8713 
     Univ: MA                              13        13841 
     Univ: PhD                             14         2885 
     Not applicable                        99       165213 
      
Coverage: 
     Valid cases 627235 Missing cases 165213 
 
 
'Census of Canada 1996, Individual Public Use Microdata' PAGE 101 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
WAGESP, Wages & Salaries 
 
 
 
Field: 101 Position: 136-142 Format: F7.0 
      
     CONTENT                            VALUE       VALID N 
     MEAN                            16031.61 
     MINIMUM                                0 
     MAXIMUM                           200000 
     RANGE                             200000       627235 
     Not applicable                   9999999 
      
 
 
